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A LEGAL ANALYSIS OF THE SHOOTING OF
KOREAN AIRLINES FLIGHT 007 BY THE
SOVIET UNION
By DR. FAROOQ HASSAN*
O N SEPTEMBER 2, 1983, the world was stunned by the
news that during the previous day the Soviet Union had
shot down a South Korean jetliner over the Sea of Japan,
killing all 269 passengers aboard. The airliner, which was on
a scheduled flight between New York and Seoul, had appar-
ently strayed off course into Soviet airspace when it was de-
stroyed by Russian jet fighter planes. The tragedy was
brought to international attention through strong statements
issued by the President and Secretary of State of the United
States.' While some aspects of this incident may never be
known, 2 sufficient data is available to analyze the legal as-
pects of the actions taken by the Korean airliner and the So-
viet interceptors.
This article will focus on one central issue: the legal status
of a trespassing civil foreign aircraft into the national airspace
of another country. At the outset, the facts of the Korean jet-
liner incident will be presented. Next, the article will ex-
*Visiting Professor of Law, University of San Diego; Professor of Law, Willamette
University; Barrister at Law, Lincoln's Inn, London; Senior Advocate, Supreme Court
of Pakistan; member, Oregon Bar; member, International Institute of Strategic Stud-
ies, London.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1983, at 1, col. 4.
While the act of aerial trespass by the Korean jetliner is beyond question, exactly
what led the Soviet interceptors to shoot it down is only known to the extent that they
have chosen to broadcast to the international community. The Soviets maintain that
the destroyed plane was engaged in espionage for the U.S. For Soviet allegations that
Korean Airlines had been spying for the U.S. since 1970, see N.Y. Times, September
17, 1983, at 3, col. 5.
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amine the application of international law, and more
specifically, international air law, to the central issue. In ad-
dition, contemporary state practice will be analyzed to deter-
mine whether unofficial, customary law has emerged in this
area of inquiry. In conclusion, the applicable international
law will be applied to the facts of the Korean jetliner tragedy
in order to evaluate the legal validity of the Soviet action in
shooting down the Korean airliner.
I. EVENTS SURROUNDING THE ATTACK ON KOREAN
AIRLINES FLIGHT 007
As stated previously, the news of the downing of the Ko-
rean plane was broadcast to the world by President Reagan
and Secretary of State Shultz.3 The President expressed "re-
vulsion" at what he described as a "horrifying act of vio-
lence."4  More specific details were provided in a news
conference held by the Secretary of State.5 Further details
were provided to the press by other officials of the State De-
partment. KAL Flight 007 left New York at 11:50 p.m. EDT
on August 31, from John F. Kennedy Airport, with 269 pas-
sengers bound for Seoul South Korea. En route it stopped at
Anchorage and left at 10:00 a.m. on September 1. Sometime
thereafter it drifted off course and at 1:00 a.m., Korean time,
Soviet radar began to track the aircraft as it entered Soviet
air space over the Kamchatka Peninsula.
The areas over which the KAL flight strayed are of a mili-
tary nature and constitute strategic airspace of the Soviet
Union. 6 After two hours of tracking the plane by radar, So-
viet pilots reported seeing the aircraft at 3:12 a.m. At that
time the airliner was traveling westward, after going south
across the southern tip of Sakhalin Island. This area contains
some of the Soviet Union's most sensitive military installa-
tions.7 At 3:21 a.m. a Soviet pilot reported to his base that
:1 N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1983, at 1, col. 4.
4* d
Id, at 5, col. 1.
Id., at 1, col. 5.
7Id
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the aircraft was flying at an altitude of 33,000 feet. Accord-
ing to a statement issued by the official Soviet news agency
on the day following the disclosure by the American govern-
ment, the KAL plane had strayed by as much as 312 miles
from its designated route.8 At 3:26 a.m., presumably after
authorization from its base command, the Soviet interceptor
jet reported firing a missile at the KAL aircraft. Four min-
utes later American and Japanese radar showed the altitude
of the Korean plane to be only 16,400 feet. It had been hit
and was on its way down into the Sea of Japan. At 3:38 a.m.,
the plane disappeared from the radar screens.9
Certain elements of the Korean airliner incident are partic-
ularly noteworthy for the present discussion. First, KAL
Flight 007"was a scheduled civilian airliner carrying passen-
gers of different nationalities on an international flight. Sec-
ond, whether by accident on account of instrument
malfunction, or by design, the Korean jetliner strayed off
course over sensitive Soviet airspace.'° Third, the airliner was
shot down apparently without warning from the Soviet
interceptors.
The first Russian report of the incident did not appear un-
til September 3, 1983, one day after the occurrence had been
reported to the world by the United States. Furthermore, far
from admitting what had happened, the Soviet report merely
acknowledged that a foreign aircraft had been tracked by the
Soviet Union, and that Soviet jet fighters had intercepted it.
The report did not mention the crucial fact that the plane
had been shot down." The obvious vagueness of the original
I N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1983, at 4, col. 1.
9 N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1983, at 1, col. 3 (relevant times found in map on page 1).
10 See NAT'L L.J. Sept. 19, 1983 at 3 (suggesting several theories for the airliner's
skewed course: e.g., malfunction of navigational equipment or deliberate overflight as a
timesaving short-cut); but see ICAO Restricted Doc. C-WP/7764, Destruction of Korean
Air Lines Boeing 747 over Sea of Japan, 35-37 (1983) (finding no evidence to support
theories of intentional overflight for purposes of espionage or short-cutting).
N.Y. Times, Sept. 2, 1983, at 4, col. 1. The official Soviet report stated:
An unidentified plane entered the airspace of the Soviet Union over the
Kamchatka Peninsula from the direction of the Pacific Ocean and then
for the second time violated the airspace ofthe U.S.S.R. over Sakhalin
Island on the night from Aug. 31 to Sept. 1. The plane did not have
navigation lights, did not respond to queries and did not enter into con-
1984]
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Soviet acknowledgment of the horrifying tragedy, 12 coupled
with rising international outcry, led to a second Soviet expla-
nation on the following day. Apart from criticizing the
United States, and suggesting that the plane had been on an
American espionage mission, the second explanation did not
add much to what had been reported the day before. 13 There
were, however, several key items contained in the second So-
viet report. First, the KAL aircraft reportedly had no naviga-
tional lights in operation at the time of the incident.
1 4
Second, it was alleged that the jetliner refused to respond to
signals from the Soviet interceptor jets.' 5 Third, the Soviets
claimed that the airliner had ignored warning and tracer
tact with the dispatcher service. Fighters of the antiaircraft defense,
which were sent aloft towards the intruder plane, tried to give it assist-
ance in directing it to the nearest airfield. But the intruder plane did not
react to the signals and warnings from the Soviet fighters and continued
its flight in the direction of the Sea of Japan. Id.
'2 The Soviet reluctance to acknowledge the shooting of the Korean jetliner was
reminiscent of the United States Government's evasiveness when, in 1960, the Soviets
shot down an American U-2 plane. See Wright, Legal Aspects ofthe U2 Incident, 54 AM.
J. INT'L L. 836 (1960).
N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1983, at 4, col. 1. The second Soviet report stated:
As it has already been reported, on the night from August 31 to Sep-
tember 1 this year, an unidentified plane had rudely violated the Soviet
state border and intruded deep into the Soviet Union's airspace. The
intruder plane had deviated from the existing international route in the
direction of the Soviet Union's territory by up to 500 kilometers and
spent more than two hours over the Kamchatka Peninsula, the area of
the Sea of Okhotsk and the island of Sakhalin.
In violation of international regulations the plane flew without navi-
gation lights, did not react to radio signals of the Soviet dispatcher serv-
ices and made no attempts to establish such communications contact.
. . . It was natural that during the time the unidentified intruder plane
was in the U.S.S.R. airspace Soviet antiair defense aircraft were ordered
aloft, which repeatedly tried to establish contacts with the plane using
generally accepted signals and to take it to the Soviet Union. The in-
truder plane, however, ignored all this. Over the Sakhalin Island, a So-
viet aircraft fired warning shots and tracer shells along the flying route of
the plane.
Soon after this the intruder plane left limits of Soviet airspace and
continued its flight toward the Sea of Japan. For about 10 minutes it
was within the observation zone of radio location means, after which it
could be observed no more.
Id
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shots fired by the intercepting aircraft. 6 Obviously, the con-
flicting Soviet and American reports left many factual details
in doubt. 7 In particular, the crucial issue of whether the Ko-
rean plane was shot down without warning after it had been
intercepted by the Soviet fighters was unresolved.
Many other questions were left unresolved. First, it is not
clear why the Korean jetliner had strayed for such a great
time and distance from its charted course into sensitive Rus-
sian airspace. Second, it is uncertain whether the air traffic
controllers in Japan realized that the plane was off course.
Third, it seems unusual that the Soviet pilots were not able to
visually identify the plane as a commercial airliner. And
fourth, it has not been revealed whether a distress signal was
ever sent by the Korean aircraft.
II. THE NATURE OF A STATE'S SOVEREIGNTY OVER ITS
AIRSPACE: HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION
A. Domestic Law
In the common law, the oft-quoted latin maxim, Cujfus Est
Solum, Ejus Est Usque Ad Coelum El Ad Infernos, recognized that
a subjacent landowner has a right of control over the airspace
above his land.' 8 Lord McNair, the English international ju-
rist, did not attribute this maxim to a rule of the Roman law,
W Id
17 On Monday, September 5, 1983, in a nationally televised broadcast, President
Reagan presented excerpts of a recording indicating that the Korean jetliner had navi-
gational blinking lights and was shot down without warning. N.Y. Times, Sept. 6,
1983, at 1. However, the State Department later issued a more detailed version of the
recording indicating that a shot, possibly a warning shot, had been fired by the in-
terceptors at the Korean jetliner. N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1983, at 1. Also, on Septem-
ber 12, 1983, U.S. officials acknowledged that although there had been an American
spy plane, an RC 135, in the vicinity of the tragedy, they were about .1000 miles apart
when Russian airspace was violated by the KAL plane. American officials also as-
serted that any initial confusion among the Soviets could not have remained when the
airliner was shot down, because they had ample time to identify it as a commercial
jetliner. N.Y. Times, Sept. 5, 1983, at 1.
1" Literally, the maxim means: To whomsoever the soil belongs, he owns also to the
sky and to the depths. That is, the owner of a piece of land owns everything above and
below it to an indefinite extent. For an extensive discussion of the origin and develop-
ment of this doctrine, see Cooper, Roman Law and the Maxim Cujus Est Solum in Interna-
ttonalAir Law, 1 McGILL L.J. 23 (1952).
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but he recognized its strong influence on the common law.19
Both Coke and Blackstone cited the maxim with approval.
Coke said that "the earth hath in law a great extent upwards,
not only of water, as hath been said, but of ayre and of all
other things even up to heaven."2 ° Similarly, Blackstone as-
serted that "land hath also, in its legal signification, an indefi-
nite extent upwards as well as downwards."2 1  In 1851,
however, Lord Ellenborough, the Chief Justice of England
expressed doubts as to whether entry into another's airspace
per se constitutes trespass.22 Fifty years later in Kenyon v.
Hart,23 Lord Blackburn, while appreciating the doubts of
Lord Ellenborough, reverted to the more categorical position
adopted by Coke and Blackstone.24
In the United States, the majority view appears to be that
if the flights of a company's planes over the property of a
private landowner demonstrate a consistent and permanent
pattern, and are excessively low, the landowner has a cause of
action against that company.25 There is, however, no viola-
, See A. MCNAIR, THE LAW OF THE AIR 393 (3d ed. 1964).
1 S. COKE, INSTITUTES, ch.1, § 1 at 4 (19th ed. 1832).
2, 2 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES * 18.
21 Pickering v. Rudd, 171 Eng. Rep. 70, 70-71 (1815).
I do not think it is a trespass to interfere with the column of air superin-
cumbent on the close. I once had occasion to rule. . . that a man who,
from the outside of a field, discharged a gun into it, so as that the shot
must have struck the soil, was guilty of breaking and entering it ....
But I am by no means prepared to say, that firing across a field Mn vacuo,
no part of the contents touching it, amounts to a clausum fegit. Nay, if
this board overhanging the plaintiff's garden be a trespass, it would fol-
low that an aeronaut is liable to an action of trespass quare clausumfiegit
at the suit of the occupier of every field over which his balloon passes in
the course of his voyage . . . . If any damage arises from the object
which overhangs the close, the remedy is by an action on the case.
Id
2: 122 Eng. Rep. 1188, 1189 (1865).
*2 Id. at 252. Blackburn said, "[T]hat case raises the old query of Lord Ellenborough
as to a man passing over the land of another in a balloon; he doubted whether an
action of trespass would lie for it. I understand the good sense of that doubt, though
not the legal reason of it." Id.
25 See, e.g., Griggs v. County of Allegheny, 369 U.S. 84 (1962) (holding that the
location of flight paths over residential property can constitute a compensible taking
by the responsible municipality); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946) (hold-
ing that a particular low-altitude military flight path over plaintiff's chicken farm con-
stituted a compensible taking by the United States in light of damage to the farming
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tion of any right in isolated and non-interfering flights across
territory held by others. 26 In Smith v. New England Aircraft
Co. 27 the court held that private ownership extends to all rea-
sonable heights in the airspace.28 In fact, the court even
touched upon the international dimensions of this matter by
observing:
It is essential to the safety of sovereign States that they pos-
sess jurisdiction to control the air space above their territories.
It seems to us to rest on the obvious practical necessity of self-
protection. Every government completely sovereign in char-
acter must possess power to prevent from entering its confines
those whom it determines to be undesirable.29
B. Intemaional Law
International law reflects the position of Anglo-American
jurisprudence outlined above. International law clearly rec-
ognizes that the sovereignty of a state extends to the airspace
above its territory.30 Broadly speaking, the basis for granting
a subjacent state the right to control the airspace above its
territory is similar to that given in domestic law: the holder
of patrimony in land should also be given the right to control
the airspace directly above it. In other words, control over
airspace is granted because of the existence of the sovereign
rights of a state in the land below it. "Sovereignty" in the
airspace is therefore a facet of the totality of interests a state
enterprise); Swetland v. Curtiss Airports Corp., 55 F.2d 201 (6th Cir. 1932) (holding
that low-altitude overflight may impose an actionable servitude upon landowner's
property, but overflight is not trespass per st).
' United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946). The Court stated:
It is ancient doctrine that at common law ownership of the land ex-
tended to the periphery of the universe - Cujus est solum ej'us est usque ad
coe/um. But that doctrine has no place in the modern world. The air is a
public highway. . . . [W]ere that not true, every transcontinental flight
would subject the operator to countless trespass suits. Common sense
revolts at the idea.
Id at 260-61.
2, 270 Mass. 511, 170 N.E. 385 (1930).
28 170 N.E. at 390.
Id. at 389.
.o See generally I. BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAw (2d ed.
1973).
1984]
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has in its land, known as territorial sovereignty."
In so far as the nature of territorial sovereignty is con-
cerned, a helpful observation was made by Judge Huber in
the Island of Palmas case.3 2 He noted that international law
has established a "principle of the exclusive competence of
the State in regard to its own territory in such a way as to
make it the point of departure in settling most questions that
concern international relations. '33 The phrase "exclusive
competence", used by Judge Huber to characterize territorial
sovereignty, implies the legal inablilty of any state to interfere
in another state's exercise of its territorial rights. While dis-
cussing the incident of the American U-2 spy plane which
was shot down by the Soviet Union in 1960, one commenta-
tor, in answering the question of a state's right to exclude in-
truders from its territory and its airspace, said, "[t]his
question must be answered in the affirmative. International
Law and the United Nations Charter are based on the princi-
ple of respect by the states for the territory and independence
of other states."' 34 This principle has been supported by both
small and large countries. For example, in United Nations
Security Council debates concerning the U-2 incident, the
delegate from Ceylon said that it is "absolutely necessary for
the preservation of peace among nations" that a country's
airspace, which is within its sovereignty, "cannot be invaded
by any other state without its authority and permission.
' 35
As will be seen in the cases of aerial trespass which have
been debated before international forums, the question of the
sovereign right of a subjacent state to control its airspace has
never been doubted. Even states which have shot planes
down have not seriously contested the right of a territorial
sovereign to total control of its airspace. For example, in the
:, See generally B. Cheng, THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL AIR TRANSPORT 3 (1962).
.1 Island of Palmas Case (Neth. v. United States), 2 R. Int'l Arb. Awards 831 (1928).
:'3 Id at 838.
:,1 Wright, supra note 12, at 844. See also Lissitzyn, Some Legal Impl'cations ofthe U-2
andRB-47Incidents, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 135, 137 (1962) (in which the author explains
that the U-2 incident involved recognized international principles of a sovereign's ex-
clusive jurisdiction over its airspace).
.- Wright, supra note 12, at 842.
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case concerning the downing by Bulgaria of an El Al Israel
Airlines plane in 1955, the Israeli memorial before the Inter-
national Court of Justice said, "the Government of Bulgaria
has furthermore admitted that in so doing its armed forces
displayed a certain haste and did not take all necessary meas-
ures to compel the aircraft to land."'36 Clearly implicit in the
Israeli statement is a recognition of the lawful right of a sub-
jacent state to control, albeit with some caution, the activities
of an unauthorized aircraft. In summary, international law
gives a territorial sovereign the right to control its airspace.
III. TRESPASSING AIRCRAFT IN INTERNATIONAL AIR LAW
A sovereign's right to control its airspace is equally well
recognized in international air law as it is in general interna-
tional law.3 7 In fact, international air law, as it exists today,
is grounded upon the fundamental principles of state sover-
eignty. The Hague Peace Conference of 1899 issued a dec-
laration which prohibited the discharge of projectiles and
explosives into another country's airspace by balloons and
other aviation devices. 39 Although the declaration did not
specifically address the question of a nation's sovereignty over
its airspace by prohibiting the discharge of projectiles across
international borders, such sovereignty was clearly implied.
At the beginning of this century, however, the French jurist,
- Aerial Incident of 27 July 1955, (Isr. v. Bulgaria, U.S.A. v. Bulgaria; U.K. v.
Bulgaria) 1959 I.C.J. Pleadings 5, 127, 130. (Preliminary Objections) [hereinafter cited
as Aerial Incident]. See Hughes, Aeral Intrusions by Civil Airliners and the Use of Force, 45
J. AIR L. & COM. 595 (1980).
.3 The term "international air law", as used herein, means the rules resulting from
international conventions dealing with civil aviation. The term is, therefore, narrower
than general international law of airspace.
Wright, supra note 12, at 845. The author states:
Penetration of the airspace of states by unauthorized craft has been espe-
cially forbidden since the first World War. The Paris Convention of
1919, the Havana Convention of 1928, and the Chicago Convention of
1944 recognize that "every state has complete and exclusive sovereignty
over the airspace above its territory" and consequently has the right to
prevent passage by civilan aircraft of other states except as permitted by
treaty.
Id
'9 Declaration as to Launching of Projectiles and Explosives from Balloons, July 29,
1899, 32 Stat. 1839, T.I.A.S. No. 393.
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Fauchille, advocated the concept of freedom of the air. His
theory, resembling the doctrine of freedom of the high seas,
was not destined to receive much acceptance. ° In 1912, Sir
Erle Richards, a professor of international law at Oxford,
wrote that:
[there is] a principle of International Law which is fundamen-
tal in the determination of the extent of State sovereignty and
must apply as much to the air space over State Territory as to
the Territory itself. This principle is that Sovereign States are
entitled to all those rights which are necessary for the preser-
vation and protection of their territories.4 '
As a practical matter, the question of rights to airspace was of
little importance to states at the turn of the century because
aviation was in its infancy.4 2 Moreover, no international con-
vention dealing with air rights existed at the time.
In response to German airpower in World War I, the
Treaty of Versailles,43 in 1919, contained several provisions
relating to air law, and prohibited the development of the
German air force." The Versailles Treaty also created an
aeronautical commission which ultimately drafted the Paris
Convention of 1919. 4' The Paris Convention was the first
major international treaty dealing with civil aviation. Al-
though only thirty eight states signed it, its applicability was
widespread. The Convention defined the nature of a subja-
cent state's rights to its airspace, envisaged international
rights of way, and contained elaborate rules for the registra-
- See Denaro, States'Jurisdiction in Aerospace Under International Law, 36 J. AIR L. &
CoM. 689, 690 (i970). Fachille presented his views at the Institute of International
Law at Ghent, Belgium in 1906. For the text of Fauchille's position, see draft Conven-
tion, Regime of Aerostats and Wireless Telegraphy of 1906, 21 Annaure de /'Istitute de
Droit Int'l, 293, 327 (1906), reprinted in7 J. SWEENEY, C. OLIVER & N. LEECH, THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL SYSTEM 230-39 (2d ed. 1981).
41 H. RICHARDS, SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE AIR 14 (1912).
42 See Denaro, supra note 40, at 689-94.
43 Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, 2 TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL
AGREEMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 1776-1949, 43 (C. Bevans, com-
piler 1969).
44 See d. arts. 198-202.
4. Convention Relating to the Regulation of Aerial Navigation, Oct. 13, 1919, 11
L.N.T.S. 173 [hereinafter cited as Paris Convention].
9] SO VEREIGNTY 0 VER AIRSPACE
tion and operation of aircraft flying transnationally.4 6 Article
1 clearly acknowledged a state's control over its airspace. 7
Furthermore, article 2 provided for the right of a participat-
ing state to fly through another state's airspace in times of
peace.48
Through another provision, the Convention expressly
made the right to international passage of scheduled air serv-
ices subject to the consent of the concerned state.4 9 The Con-
vention failed to give recognition to the principle of freedom
of passage for international air services. Thus, the Paris Con-
vention did not change the existing practice of leaving inter-
national civil aviation to the mercy of the states across whose
territory aircraft might happen to pass.
The next important milestone in civil aviation was the
Convention on International Civil Aviation signed at Chi-
cago in 1944 (Chicago Convention) .50 The Chicago Conven-
tion, which is still in force, generally follows the pattern and
philosophy of the Paris Convention of 1919.5' It did not se-
cure the right for international civil air services to cross inter-
national boundaries without permission from the subjacent
state. Conversely, neither did it recognize the absolute right
of a subjacent state to control its airspace. Importantly,
though, the Chicago Convention created the most important
existing authority for the supervision of civil aviation, the In-
ternational Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO).
The Chicago Convention is divided into three main parts.
The second part deals with the creation of the ICAO,52 and
the last part concerns international air services.53 For the
purposes of this article, it is the first part which is most rele-
-' Paris Convention, supra note 45, arts. I-XXV.
47 Id art. 1. "The High Contracting Parties recognize that every Power has com-
plete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above its territory. Id.
- Id art. 2.
4 Id art. 15, para. 2.
- Convention on International Civil Aviation, Dec. 7, 1944, 61 Stat. 1180, T.I.A.S.
No. 1591 [hereinafter cited as Chicago Convention].
1, Denaro, supra note 40, at 695-96.
', Chicago Convention, supra note 50, pt. II.
'Id. pt. III.
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vant since it deals with international aviation principles.54
Article 1 confirms a subjacent state's right to control its air
space: "The contracting States recognize that every State has
complete and exclusive sovereignty over the air space above
its territory. ' 55 Article 2 explains that the national airspace of
a state includes the air above territorial waters as well as the
air over land territory.56 Article 3 provides that the Chicago
Convention applies to civil aircraft, in exclusion of aircraft
owned by states for military purposes. 57 Article 6 states: "No
scheduled international air service may be operated over or
into the territory of a contracting State, except with the spe-
cial permission or other authorization of that State, and in
accordance with the terms of such permission or authoriza-
tion."58 Thus, it was made absolutely clear that foreign civil-
ian passenger airliners cannot pass without permission into
other nations' airspace. The word used in article 6 is "sched-
uled," which refers to regularly operating civil passengers air-
lines. In contrast, article 5 applies to "non-scheduled"
civilian aircraft.5 9 Article 5 grants fairly extensive rights to
purely private aircraft to fly across another country's air-
space, subject to the restrictions contained in the Conven-
tion.6" It is important to note for purposes of this article that
54 Id. pt. I.




,9 Id art. 5.
- Chicago Convention, supra note 50, art. 5. This article states:
Each contracting State agrees that all aircraft of the other contracting
States, being aircraft not engaged in scheduled international air services,
shall have the right, subject to the observance of the terms of this Con-
vention, to make flights into or in transit non-stop across its territory and
to make stops for non-traffic purposed without the necessity of obtaining
prior permission, and subject to the right of the State flown over to re-
quire landing. Each contracting State nevertheless reserves the right for
reasons of safety of flight, to require aircraft desiring to proceed over
regions which are inaccessible or without adequate air navigation facili-
ties to follow prescribed routes, or to obtain special permission for such
flights.
Id It was principally on account of this provision, giving non-scheduled aircraft cer-
tain rights to fly, that the Soviet Union refused to become a party to the Chicago
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the Convention was designed to apply to private, rather than
state-owned aircraft.
International aviation law is, therefore, similar to the
broad international law principles applicable to airspace
rights. The absolute sovereignty of a subjacent state over its
airspace is well recognized among nations, and is accepted by
the leading treaties on the subject. In addition, the right of
international passage to civilian aircraft of foreign nations is
based in each case on agreements with the subjacent state. It
is always possible, however, that a subjacent state's national
interest may act to oust the arrangements already made that
allow civilian aircraft to fly through its airspace. In particu-
lar, two provisions of the Chicago Convention recognize that
a subjacent state may, in certain circumstances, disregard ex-
isting arrangements concerning civil aviation. Article 89 pro-
vides for complete freedom of action in the event of war or
national emergency. 6I Furthermore, article 9 recognizes a na-
tion's right to restrict the flight of foreign civil aircraft for
reasons of military necessity or public safety. Such restric-
tions must not be discriminatory in favor of domestic, over
foreign, airlines, and must restrict all foreign aircraft
equally.62
Thus, the legal control of a subjacent state over its airspace
appears virtually absolute. One commentator, while recog-
nizing that this absolute right could be abused, nevertheless
acknowledged its existence when he said, "[s]tates seem to be
agreed that each one of them has an absolute discretion in
this matter; not only are no reasons for refusal condemned,
but it seems to be agreed that no reason for refusal need be
given. As this commentator was astute to point out, the
only real sanction against the abuse of a sovereign's right
would appear to be international public opinion and world
Convention. In 1970, however, the Soviet Union finally adhered to the Chicago Con-
vention. See Denaro, supra note 40, at 695-96.
Chicago Convention, supra note 50, art. 89.
Id art. 9.
Jennings, International Ci'ul Aviatin and the Law, 22 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 191, 199
(1945).
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conscience. 4 The strength of such a sanction is, at best,
uncertain.
IV. THE FATE OF TRESPASSING AIRCRAFT: SOME
PRECEDENT
On July 27, 1955, a Constellation of El Al Israel Airlines
was shot down by Bulgarian fighters while trespassing over
Bulgarian airspace. The flight was on its way from Vienna,
Austria, to Istanbul, Turkey and was carrying fifty-one pas-
sengers and seven crew members. All aboard were killed.65
An action was commenced before the International Court of
Justice by Israel for the destruction of its aircraft and civilans
as being contrary to international law. Similar actions for
compensation were also commenced by the United States
and the United Kingdom on behalf of their nationals who
were killed in the incident.66
Although the main action failed on the ground that Bulga-
ria had not accepted the jurisdiction of the court,6 7 the plead-
ings of the claimants shed some light on the issues involved.
From the pleadings it seems to have been accepted that a
state which owns a civil aircraft which has trespassed into an-
other country's airspace can legally expect that the subjacent
state, instead of shooting down the intruder, will give the air-
craft appropriate warnings, and then take measures to make
it land safely.68 It was also apparently conceded that a tres-
passing aircraft may be compelled to land by force in the sub-
jacent state.69  These points are, however, deducible from
pleadings only, since the court did not give any authoritative
pronouncement on the issues involved.7 °
-' Id.
Hughes, supra note 36, at 602-03.
Id. at 604-05.
67 Article 36 of the International Court of Justice statute provides that the court
may maintain jurisdiction only over those nations which accept its jurisdiction. Char-
ter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice, June 26,
1945, 59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993, art. 36 [hereinafer cited as statute of I.C.J.].
- See Aerial Incident, supra note 36, at 94-95, 216-26, 223-40, 337-64; see also
Hughes, supra note 36, at 608-10.
'- See Aerial Incident, supra note 36, at 94-95, 216-26, 223-40, 337-64.
70 Hughes, supra note 36, at 610-11.
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On February 21, 1973, Israel shot down a Libyan jetliner
on a scheduled flight between Libya and Egypt. It was carry-
ing 113 people, out of whom 108 were killed. The plane was
shot down when it strayed into airspace above the Israeli-oc-
cupied Sinai. When the jetliner, a Boeing 707, was fired
upon it was twelve miles east of the closed Suez Canal and
within sight of the Cairo airport.7'
Libya, and other Arab and Western nations, strongly pro-
tested the Israeli actions. Israel's position was that the plane
had been shot because it had strayed over fifty miles into Is-
raeli-held territory, and had flown over military installations.
Apparently no attempt had been made to land the plane be-
cause Israel asserted that the reason for bringing it down was
that it was about to commit a terrorist act.72 Aside from the
Israeli allegation, there was no evidence of terrorist activity.
Regardless of factual disputes, however, military necessity
was cited by Israel to justify the destruction of the passenger
jet without warning.
Unfortunately, the destruction of an intruder aircraft, civil
or military, has not been directly addressed by the existing
treaty law. Indeed, both the Paris Convention and the Chi-
cago Convention, which deal primarily with civil aviation,
are silent on the issue of attacks on intruding foreign air-
craft. 73 These treaties do, however, recognize, in unequivocal
terms, a subjacent State's unfettered control over its air-
space. 74 In summation, scheduled aircraft may traverse an-
other state's territory by bilateral arrangements based on the
subjacent country's consent. Furthermore, such consent,
even if granted, may always be withdrawn on the grounds of
national security interests, a state of emergency, or the public
11 The Times (London), Feb. 22, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
72 N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1973, at 1, col. 8. The shooting of the Libyan jetliner was
condemned by the ICAO Council, which recommended that interception of a civilian
passenger airliner should only be undertaken as a last resort. This statement is the
only ICAO condemnation on record concerning the shooting of a trespassing passenger
plane. Israel later apologized for the incident and paid compensation to the families of
the dead victims. See N. MATFE, TREATISE ON AIR-AERONAUTICAL LAW 175-76
(1981).
11 See supra text accompanying notes 42-58.
74 Id.
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interest. Although a valid reason for exercising this right of
withdrawal may exist in some cases, in many instances the
state merely acts on its own authority without concern for
justification.
V. LEGAL PRINCIPLES DERIVED FROM INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNICATIONS IN PAST AVIATION INCIDENTS
A leading international incident in which the correspon-
dence between the concerned states throws light on interna-
tional rights in airspace involved the shooting of two
American military planes by Yugoslavia in 1946." 5 On two
separate occasions American planes were shot down while
passing through Yugoslav airspace.7 6 There was disagree-
ment as to whether the planes had been forced into Yugoslav
airspace by bad weather, as the United States contended, or
were intruding intentionally." Furthermore, the American
position was that the intercepting planes made no signal to
request the American planes to land.7" In response, Yugosla-
via claimed that in the second incident the American plane
had been requested to land approximately fifteen minutes
before it was shot down.7 9 It is evident that both the United
States and Yugoslavia, while disputing the fundamental
facts, did not doubt that it is a valid principle of law that the
intruding planes should have been asked to land. If such a
request had been refused, it might be argued that the Yugos-
lays were justified in opening fire on the intruders. The
United States rejected this position and stated that the planes
did not constitute a threat to the security of Yugoslavia, and
therefore the use of force was unjustified in international
law.80
Both the United States and Yugoslavia appeared to ac-
, See generally N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1949 at 1, col. 3, and at 4, col. 2.
. Id. The shootings occurred on August 9 and 19, with the second resulting in five
deaths. Id.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1946 at 4, col. 2.
7" Id
79 Protest Against Attack on American Plane and Detention of American Personnel, 15 DEP'T
ST. BULL. 415, 419 (1946).
- Id at 417-18.
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knowledge that, if on account of poor weather a plane in-
trudes into another country's airspace, there is no justification
for shooting it down, even if it happens to be a military air-
craft.8" In addition, the intruder must be warned by appro-
priate signals to land in the territory of the subjacent state.8 2
Marshall Tito admitted as much to a gathering of Anglo-
American correspondents:
I have issued orders to our military authorities to the effect
that no transport planes must be fired at any more, even if
they might intentionally fly over our territory without proper
clearance, but that in such cases they should be invited to
land; if they refuse to do so their identity should be taken and
the Yugoslav Government informed thereof so that any neces-
sary steps could be undertaken through appropriate
channels. 8
3
In accordance with this conciliatory statement, Yugoslavia
agreed on humanitarian grounds to pay compensation to the
families of the dead victims.84
In 1952, a French commercial aircraft, while flying from
Frankfurt to Berlin, was fired upon by the Soviet Union. 5
No one was killed, but the plane was damaged and two of its
occupants were injured.86 The Soviets denied that they tried
to bring down the plane by force when it deviated from its
course and into Soviet territory. 7 Instead, they asserted that
the plane had been inadvertently hit by warning shots.88 In
the ensuing Western protest it was denied that the plane had
entered Soviet territory, and was asserted that to fire in any
circumstances on an unarmed aircraft in time of peace is en-
tirely unacceptable and contrary to all standards of civilized
See N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1946, at 4, col. 2.
I d.
Facts Relating to Fikht ofAmerican Planes over Yugoslav Teritory, 15 DEP'T ST. BULL.
501, 505 (1946).
,,, N.Y. Times, Oct. 10, 1946, at 1, col. 6. The Yugoslav government paid $30,000 to
each of the families of the five victims. Id
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behavior. 9
In the episode of the Soviet downing of a Swedish aircraft
in 1952, the Soviet Union issued a communication which de-
scribed its aerial interception procedures.9 ° In the Soviet
Union, "if a foreign aircraft violates the State frontier and if a
foreign aircraft penetrates into the territory of another Power,
it is the duty of the airmen of the State concerned to force
such aircraft to land on a local airfield and, in case of resist-
ance, to open fire on it." 9' Thus, even the Soviet Union's po-
sition seems to be that an intruding foreign aircraft, civilian
or military, will first be given a warning to land, and only
fired upon in case of resistance.92
In October of 1952, the United States lost a military air-
craft when it flew over an area near northern Japan.93 The
American bomber was shot down by Soviet interceptors.94 In
its explanation of the incident, the Soviet Union pointed out
that, in the USSR there are instructions in force which pro-
vide that, in case of a violation of the state frontier by a for-
eign airplane, flyers are required to force it to land at a local
airport and in case of resistance to open fire upon the plane.95
Once again, the Soviet position was that an intruding plane
will be given a warning and may be fired upon only in the
case of resistance or flight.
In March of 1953, a British military aircraft was shot down
over East German territory.96 In response to a British protest,
" Id
See SWEDEN, DOCUMENTS PUBLISHED BY THE ROYAL MINISTRY FOR FOREIGN
AFFAIRS, NEW SERIES II: 2 STOCKHOLM 1952, ATTACKS UPON Two SWEDISH AIR-
CRAFT OVER THE BALTIC IN JUNE 1952 [hereinafter cited as SWEDISH INCIDENT
REPORT].
!, Id at 16.
92 Id Swedish interception rules provide that intruding aircraft are to be given a
warning before they may be attacked. Aircraft in distress or desiring to land or both
are to be directed where to land. Aircraft with obvious hostile intentions, which com-
mit an act of violence in Swedish territory, may be fired upon without warning. Id at
28.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 12, 1952, at 5, col. 1.
N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1952, at 1, col. 2.
Id; USSR. Charged With Mszrepresenting Facts in Bomber Incident, 27 DEP'T STATE
BULL. 649-50 (1952).
% See generally N.Y. Times, Mar. 13-18, 1953.
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the Soviet Union asserted that warning shots had been fired
by Soviet interceptors. The Soviet government maintained
that not only were the warning shots ignored, the British
plane even fired back at the interceptors. Only after such al-
leged acts of resistance was the British plane shot down.
The most thorough international comments on the status
of intruding aircraft arose out of the incident involving the
shooting down by Bulgaria of the Israeli passenger airliner in
1955, discussed in section IV of this article. 98 Because the
matter was taken to the International Court of Justice, the
claimant states submitted memorials outlining their legal po-
sition regarding the incident. The gist of the Israeli position
was that, except for purposes of self-defense, a subjacent state
can not rightfully shoot down a passenger airliner; instead,
there is an obligation to take appropriate measures to warn
and land the plane.99 Israel argued that the Bulgarian au-
thorities "knew that the aircraft, even when unidentified by
them, was a foreign one of unknown origin, and for that rea-
son they were ab initio obliged to comport themselves, in
their relations with the aircraft, in accordance with the gen-
eral rules of international law and standard international
practices."' 00 Israel then stressed that before it used force
by Bulgaria it should have complied with the requisite rules
of international law. According to Israel, the Bulgarians were
under an obligation to use force commensurate with the real-
ity and gravity of the threat posed by the intruding air-
craft. ' With regard to the nature of the sovereign rights of a
subjacent state, Israel acknowledged that "every state has
complete and exclusive sovereignty over the airspace above
its territory."' 0 2 It concluded, however, that such sovereignty
may only be protected by appropriate means.' 3 After con-
q7 Id.
See Aerial Incident, supra note 36; See also Aerial Incident of July 27, 1955 (Isr. v.
Bulgaria) 1959 I.C.J. Pleadings 5 (Application Instituting Proceedings on Behalf of the
Government of Israel, Oct. 9, 1957) [hereinafter cited as Pleadings].
Pleadings, supra note 98, at Memorial of the Government of Israel, June 2, 1958.
Id para. 59.
Id para. 61.
,2 Id para. 65.
1 Id
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tending that a subjacent state has an obligation to use appro-
priate means to assert its authority, Israel went on to list
permissible methods of dealing with such an intruder.'
4
First, the interceptors may signal to the intruder that it is per-
forming an unauthorized act, and order it to return to au-
thorized airspace or submit to examination after landing in
the subjacent state. °5 A second alternative is for the subja-
cent state to deal with the infringement of its sovereignty by
appropriate actions through diplomatic channels. 106 Further-
more, Israel asserted that, in normal times, once a civilian
plane has been intercepted, "no legal qualification" exists to
shoot it down.'0 7
The United Kingdom also made submissions to the court,
which detailed its views. The British position, like that of
Israel, rested on the limitations placed on the use of force by
international law.' The British contended that force may
only be used within the recognized limits of the principle of
self-defense.' 0 9 In this regard, the British asserted that "there
can be no justification in international law for the destruc-
tion, by a State using armed force, of a foreign civil aircraft,
clearly identifiable as such, which is on a scheduled passenger
flight, even if that aircraft enters without previous authoriza-
tion the airspace above the territory of that State."" 0 The
British statement is the clearest yet on the point that even an
unauthorized entry by a foreign civil airliner into the air-
space of another country cannot justify destruction by in-
terceptors from the subjacent state. The British position is
that only as a matter of self-defense may an intruder plane be
shot down. Unauthorized entry, or subsequent disobeyance
of an order to land are not sufficient grounds under this view
for use of destructive force against intruding aircraft.




"- Pleadings, supra note 98, at Memorial of the Government of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Aug. 18, 1958.
- Id para. 66.
1i1 Io.
SO VEREIGNTY OVER AIRSPACE
It is interesting to note that the British submission analo-
gized the case of an intruder aircraft to the situation of ships
in distress under the law of the sea.' 11 It contended that just
as a ship in distress is entitled to protection while within the
territorial waters of a foreign country,' the same is true of a
strayed aircraft in distress." 3 A final argument of the British
position was that the silence of the Paris and Chicago Con-
ventions as to the right of a subjacent state vis-a-vis the fate
of a trespassing plane implies is that there is no right to de-
stroy the intruder.' 14
The American submission to the court in the Bulgarian in-
cident focused on the point that even if the Israeli plane had
inadvertently trespassed into Bulgarian airspace, recognized
interception procedures should have been followed in order
to make the intruder land. ' 5 The American memorial then
suggested that two acceptable methods for dealing with the
intruding plane would have been either to escort it safely to
an air base, or file a diplomatic protest at a later time.' 16 The
American memorial addressed the absence of any direct pro-
vision in international aviation law on the issue. The United
States noted that while it is true that nothing in the Conven-
tions disallows the shooting of an intruding plane, the exist-
ence of such a right is not supported by general priniciples of
"1 Id para. 68-70.
"2 See Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, Draft Convention, U.N. Doc.
A/Conf. 62/WP. 10/Rev. 3 (1980), at arts. 18, 24, 98.
':1 Pleadings, supra note 98, at Memorial of the Government of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Aug. 18, 1958, para. 68-70.
,,4 Id para. 78.
,,r. Pleadings, supra note 98, at Memorial of the Government of the United States of
America, Dec. 2, 1958, para. 1. The United States argued:
A safe alternative means that the airplane should either have been told
from the ground, by voice radio, or by CW transmission, on an interna-
tional radio frequency used by airplanes in flight, or it should have been
told by the fighters intercepting it, that it was off course. It should then
have been either escorted back to-Yugoslavia or given a route to fly
safely to Yugoslavia, or even to Greece. If there were Bulgarian terrain
security questions already raised, 4X-AKC should have been given com-
prehensible communications to lead it to a designated airport with safety
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international law. "17
VI. INTERNATIONAL RULES AND PRACTICES
Under the Chicago Convention's rules of the air, standards
and recommended practices are to be nationally enacted,
though efforts should be made to make them uniform among
nations. Article 12 of the Chicago Convention charges each
participating state with the responsibility to ensure that its
flight regulations are observed, that its aircraft obey foreign
rules, and that its domestic rules conform to those established
by the Chicago Convention.18 Furthermore, article 12 pro-
vides that over the high seas the rules of the Chicago Conven-
tion apply." 9
Therefore, while a civil aircraft of one country is flying
over another state's territory, the relevant rules of the air of
that state should be respected. Accordingly, while the sanc-
tity of the rules of the air stems from an international conven-
tion, the content of the rules is municipal in character.
Regulations made by the ICAO, the international institution
created by the Chicago Convention, are essentially in the na-
ture of a model, because by the express terms of the Chicago
Convention they have no binding force.'2 0  The Chicago
Convention envisions that the participating states will main-
tain rules which are in harmony with those promulgated by
the ICAO.'
21
The Chicago Convention calls for the creation of uniform
"international standards" and "recommended practices".
22
,,7 Id para. 2.
"' Chicago Convention, supra note 50, art. 12.
119 Id.
,,, Id. art. 37.
121 Id
'2 See ICAO Assembly Resolution Al-31, ICAO Doc. 7670 (1955).
In its first assembly, the ICAO adopted the following definition for "standards" and
"recommended practices":
That "standard" means any specification for physical characteristics,
configuration, material, performance, personnel or procedure, the uni-
form application of which is recognized as necessary for the safety or
regularity of international air navigation and to which Member States
will conform in accordance with the Convention; in the event of impossi-
bility of compliance, notification to the Council is compulsory under Ar-
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Therefore, it empowers the ICAO to promulgate such guide-
lines in order to provide a model to be followed by the vari-
ous nations in pursuing international uniformity. 123  Article
54(l) makes it a mandatory function of the ICAO to adopt
international standards and recommended practices in the
form of annexes to the Chicago Convention and then to no-
tify all contracting states of the action taken. 24
For a standard or recommended practice to become a part
of the Chicago Convention, it must be designated as an an-
nex and formally adopted as such through the procedure out-
lined in the Chicago Convention. 125  Like the "rules"
envisaged by article 12, however, the "standards" and "rec-
ommended practices" do not acquire the status of law unless
adopted through domestic legislation of the signatory
states.126 Thus, while the ICAO makes regulations, their ulti-
mate validity depends on domestic enforcement legislation
among the signatory nations. Furthermore, the philosophy of
having the ICAO make such regulations is to achieve uni-
formity in the functioning of international civil aviation serv-
ices. In accordance with this international scheme, the
parties involved in past incidents of aerial trespass by civilian
aircraft have relied either upon their own accepted practices
or those of other countries in dealing with such situations.
The international aircraft interception procedures and the
signals to be given when such situations arise are detailed in
ticle 38 of the Convention. The full name of this class of specifications
will be "ICAO Standards for Air Navigation." The current abbreviation
will be "Standards". That "Recommended Practice" means any specifi-
cation for physical characteristics, configuration, material, performance,
personnel, or procedure, the uniform application of which is recognized
as desirable in the interest of safety, regularity, or efficiency of interna-
tional air navigation, and to which Member States will endeavor to con-
form in accordance with the Convention. The full name of this class of
specifications will be "ICAO Recommended Practices for Air Naviga-
tion." The current abbreviation will be "Recommended Practices".
Id
I Chicago Convention, supra note 50, art. 37.
I2 ld. art. 54(1).
12 Id. art. 90.
,26 Id., arts. 12, 37; M. WHITEMAN, 9 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 404 (1973).
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annex 2 of the Chicago Convention. 27 In the United States,
domestic legislation has been enacted which respects the phi-
losophy of the Chicago Convention. The relevant rules are
found in the Federal Aviation Regulations and the instruc-
tions issued by the Federal Aviation Authority to aircraft op-
erators.'28 The Federal Aviation Regulations provide that
civil aircraft of United States registry must comply with an-
nex 2 of the Chicago Convention when flying over the high
seas. 2 9 Furthermore, the regulations require American civil
aircraft to comply with the aviation rules of any country
whose airspace they traverse. 30 Thus, while providing full
deference to annex 2 of the Chicago Convention where appli-
cable, it is stressed in the regulations that an aircraft bound
by United States law must comply with local regulations
while flying over a foreign country. 131
VII. EMERGENT PRINCIPLES OF LAW
The clearest and most uncontroverted principle of interna-
tional law supported by multilateral treaties is that a subja-
cent state has the right to control its own airspace. 32 It is
unnecessary to discuss the altitude limits of this right because
this article is concerned with civil passenger airlines. Clearly,
the altitude up to which airliners can fly are within the extent
encompassed by this right. 3 3 One possible argument, how-
ever, for a state which loses a trespassing aircraft is that its
plane was not actually in the attacking country's airspace. It
seems obvious that a territorial sovereign may only exercise
its rights against an aircraft which is actually over its land or
water territory, and thus trespassing.
Another emergent principle of international law is that, re-
gardless of whether an intruding plane might have only in-
advertently strayed off course, the subjacent sovereign has the
'21 Chicago Convention, supra note 50, annex 2.
,2R 14 C.F.R. § 91 (1968).
,2Id. at § 91.1.
SId
1d.
,:,2 See Wright, supra note 12, at 847.
,33 id
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right to intercept the trespasser and make efforts to land it.
While the interception right of a subjacent state remains a
valid one, there are two instances in which an unintentional
trespass may be regarded as justifiable in law. Where appli-
cable, these theories would operate to limit the actions taken
by a subjacent sovereign.
First, it is apparent from the case of the shooting down of
American military planes by Yugoslavia that if conditions of
weather force an aircraft to intrude, the mere act of trespass
should not entitle the subjacent state to shoot down the in-
truding plane. Both the United States and Yugoslavia
seemed to agree on this position.' 4 Moreover, when a civil-
ian passenger plane is forced by weather conditions to in-
trude, the reasons for not attacking become even stronger.
The second circumstance in which an aircraft may justifia-
bly stray into another country's airspace is if the aircraft is in
distress. This was one of the major arguments made by the
British in the Bulgarian incident.135 This argument rests on
two main foundations. First, in analogy to the law of the sea,
if on account of over-riding necessity a plane enters another
country's airspace, then like a vessel in distress it is not to be
considered in violation of any law of the territorial sover-
eign. 36 Instead, it is entitled to assistance commensurate with
its predicament. 137 Secondly, both the Paris Convention and
the Chicago Convention contain provisions covering aircraft
in distress. Article 22 of the Paris Convention provides that
"[a]ircraft of the contracting States shall be entitled to the
same measures of assistance for landing, particularly in case
of distress, as national aircraft."' 38 The corresponding provi-
sion in the Chicago Convention states:
See generally N.Y. Times, Sept. 4, 1946, at 1 col. 3; Oct. 10, 1946, at 1, col. 6.
See Pleadings, supra note 98, at Memorial of the Government of the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Aug. 28, 1958.
'31 Under the law of the sea, a vessel in distress has the right of innocent passage
through a sovereign's territorial waters. The sovereign, moreover, has a duty to pro-
vide assistance to the craft. See Third U.N. Conference on the Law of the Sea, supra
note 112, at arts. 18, 24, 98.
137 Id paras. 68-70; see also C. COLOMBOS, INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA 249
(3d ed. 1954).
3"f Paris Convention, supra note 45, art. 22.
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Each contracting State undertakes to provide such measures
of assistance to aircraft in distress in its territory as it may find
practicable, and to permit, subject to control by its own au-
thorities, the owners of the aircraft or authorities of the State
in which the aircraft is registered to provide such measures of
assistance as may be necessitated by the circumstances
139
It would seem, therefore, that if a trespassing aircraft gives an
indication of its distress to the subjacent state, it should be
provided with suitable assistance.140
An important issue in international air law is the applica-
tion of the doctrine of self-defense to cases of aerial trespass.
In a number of the incidents considered above it was asserted
by various parties that unarmed planes which pose no danger
to asubjacent state cannot be justifiably shot down. 14  Some
of the- most articulate statements on this issue are found in the
pleadings of the case involving the shooting down of the Is-
raeli plane by Bulgaria. The British government said, "[i]n
general, the use of armed force against foreign ships or air-
craft is not justified in international law, unless it is used in
the legitimate exercise of the right of self-defense."'14 2 Addi-
tionally, Israel argued that the degree of force employed by a
state in such circumstances is governed by international
law. 43 These nations contended that unless an intruder
plane poses an immediate military threat, under general prin-
ciples of international law concerning the use of force, it may
not be shot down. 44 Conversely, an intruder may only be
shot down under circumstances of legitimate self-defense.
In the application of the doctrine of self-defense, the dis-
tinction between civil and military aircraft assumes special
significance. Obviously, an ordinary passenger airliner does
,: 9Chicago Convention, supra note 50, art. 25.
- See Lissitzyn, The Treatment of Aerial Intruders in Recent Practice and International Law,
47 Am. J. INT'L L. 559, 588 (1953).
,4, See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 75-83.
,42 See Pleadings, supra note 98, at Memorial of the Government of the United King-
dom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
1' See Pleadings, supra note 98, at Memorial of the Government of Israel.
-" See Pleadings, supra note 93.
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not pose a military threat to the subjacent state. Thus, if the
law states that even a trespassing military plane should not be
shot down in the absence of a national security threat to the
subjacent state, logically, an ordinary scheduled civil flight
may not be destroyed in the absence of such a danger. Israel,
however, which appeared to be a strong advocate of prohibit-
ing the use of force against civil airliners, shot down a Libyan
passenger airliner in 1973, on the pretext that it was a secur-
ity risk.145
The justification of self-defense is based on general princi-
ples of international law, 4 6 not on any specific rules of inter-
national air law. Each case of aerial trespass and subsequent
shooting calls for an examination of the particular facts of the
occurrence. Nevertheless, there exists a controlling legal prin-
ciple to apply in such instances. This legal principle advo-
cates that, prime facie, a passenger airliner, whether
trespassing intentionally or not, should not be considered to
pose a military threat to a territorial sovereign sufficient to
justify the plane's destruction. A mere refusal to land after
being ordered to do so is not a valid basis for use of force by
the subjacent sovereign. Actual hostility committed, or about
to be committed, by the trespassing plane is the only basis
which can justify the subjacent state in using force against the
plane. While normally a passenger airliner should not be con-
sidered a threat to a territorial sovereign, in an isolated case,
given today's technology, a subjacent state may be justified in
treating an apparently civilian aircraft as a security risk. Be-
cause this threat would only be true in the exceptional case, a
heavy burden rests on a territorial sovereign to substantiate
such an allegation before acting in self-defense.
Another issue which arises out of cases involving aerial tres-
pass is whether an intruder plane allegedly involved in spying
can be shot down, with or without warning, under the doc-
trine of self-defense. In other words, does spying constitute
the kind of hostile action against a subjacent state which jus-
,4', The Times (London), Feb. 22, 1973, at 1, col. 1.
146 See generally, Badr, The Exculpatogy Efct of Se/f-Defense in State Responsibility, 10 GA.
J. INT'L L. 1 (1980).
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tifies the use of force by that country against the spying
plane? The answer obviously depends upon whether spying
activities can be equated in law with hostile acts against the
security interests of the territorial sovereign.
The major precedent in this context is the American U-2
reconnaissance plane incident in 1960. In that case, not only
was the admitted purpose of the plane military intelligence
gathering, but the United States never protested the shooting
nor the subsequent trial and imprisonment of its pilot, Gary
Powers.' 47 The American response led one author to con-
clude that:
the U-2 incident-particularly the absence of a United States
protest against the shooting down of the plane further sug-
gests that in some circumstances no previous warning or order
to land is required by international law before an intruding
foreign aircraft is shot down, even if the intruder does not it-
self attack or is likely to attack.'
4 1
Therefore, in some cases aerial trespass for spying or military
reconnaissance may be considered legally sufficient to justify
the use of force by the subjacent state against the intruding
aircraft. '49
Given the state of contemporary military sophistication, it
is virtually impossible for a subjacent state to detect whether
an intruder has any hostile intentions, or to wait for hostile
acts to occur before taking any self-defense measures. The
Soviet foreign minister, Andrei Gromyko, pointed out this
difficulty when he opened the Security Council debate on the
U-2 incident. He asserted that because even a single plane
can carry a highly destructive warhead, immediate military
retaliation against an intruder by the subjacent state is justi-
fied by the principles of international law.1
50
The principle which emerges from an examination of com-
,- Editorial Comment, 46 ANN. J. INT'L. 135 (1962).
- Id, at 138.
,41 15 U.N. SCOR (857th mtg) at paras. 53, 54, 64, 68-86, U.N. Doc S/P.V. 857
(1960).
- See Wright, supra note 12, and Lissitzyn, supra note 34 for further discussion of
the U-2 incident.
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munications between the states involved in past incidents of
aerial trespass is that regardless of the voluntary or involun-
tary nature of the intrusion, and apart from whether the sub-
jacent country considers it to be a security threat or not, once
a foreign aircraft has been intercepted, it should be asked to
land after appropriate warnings. This was the express or im-
plied stand of all the countries which have been involved in
past incidents. Despite the fact that the Chicago Convention
interception guidelines are not technically binding, similar
domestic rules have been followed or acknowledged in past
cases of aerial trespass.
International interception procedures have, therefore, by
force of widespread acceptance, become a part of customary
international law. The International Court of Justice recog-
nizes international custom as a major source of international
law. 5 1 International custom is that practice which states ac-
cept in their dealings as binding.15 2 Evidence of such customs
can come from international correspondence, specific stands
taken by nations on particular issues of law, and consistent
practice by various countries of the world. 5 3 The uniformity
necessary for a particular practice to qualify as international
custom was described by the International Court of Justice:
The party which relies on a custom . . . must prove that this
custom is established in such a manner that it has become
binding on the other party ...that the rule invoked ...is
in accordance with a constant and uniform usage practised by
the States in question, and that this usage is the expression of
a right appertaining to the State granting asylum and a duty
incumbent on the territorial State. This follows from Article
38 of the Statute of the Court, which refers to international
custom 'as evidence of a general practice accepted as law."
54
Therefore, in order for any state practice to qualify as custom
" Statute of the I.C.J., supra note 67, art. 38.
,r-2 J. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 61 (6th ed. 1963).
r, H. LAUTERPACHT, THE DEVELOPMENT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW BY THE INTER-
NATIONAL COURT 368-93 (1958).
- Asylum Case (Colom. v. Peru), 1950 I.CJ. 266, 276 (Judgment of Nov. 20); see
also Fisheries Jurisdiction Case (U. K. v. Nor.), 1951 I.C.J. 116, 131 (Judgment of Dec.
18).
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it must have been widely accepted as such by states at large.
This requirement was recognized again by the International
Court of Justice in 1951 in the Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, when
it remarked that the twelve mile fishery zone "appears now to
be generally accepted."1 55
There is now a customary rule of international law that an
intruding passenger airliner must not be attacked without be-
ing warned, in accordance with internationally recognized in-
terception procedures, that it is in forbidden airspace and
must land in the territory of the subjacent state. In various
aerial trespass incidents occuring since the creation of the
Chicago Convention, the aggressor states have consistently
maintained that the intruder was brought down after the in-
ternationally recognized warning procedures were fol-
lowed. 5 6 The observance of warning procedures seems to be
generally acknowledged as binding. Although there was con-
siderable doubt in some cases as to whether the subjacent
states had actually employed warning procedures, their for-
mal position was that warnings were given in accordance
with internationally accepted procedures.'5 7 It was also gen-
erally accepted that interceptors can open fire in the event of
a refusal by a trespassing plane to land or if the intruder fires
at the interceptors.'58 In sum, it appears that a customary
rule of international law exists which provides that the inter-
ception of an intruding passenger airliner may only take
place in accordance with the guidelines contained in Annex 2
of the Chicago Convention.159 Furthermore, no force should
be used against a trespassing plane which strays from its
scheduled course, unless appropriate warning signals have
been given and disregarded. Destruction of a trespassing air-
craft may only be justified when done in accordance with the
doctrine of self-defense.
1951 I.C.J. Reports 116, 131.
' See, e.g. , supra text accompanying notes 96-97.
157 Id
118 See, e.g. supra note 92 and accompanying text.
1,9 See Aerial Incident of March 10th, 1953 (United States v. Czech.), 1956 I.CJ.
Pleadings 8 (Application Instituting Proceedings, March 22, 1955).
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VIII. WAS THE SHOOTING OF THE KOREAN JETLINER
UNLAWFUL?
In light of the foregoing discussion, consideration must be
given to the issue of whether the Soviet Union's actions in
shooting down Korean Airlines flight 007 on September 1,
1983, amounted to a violation of Soviet obligations under in-
ternational law. There are two major aspects to this issue.
First, since the airliner was admittedly far off course and well
into Soviet airspace, the question arises whether it was
warned by the Soviets.1 60 Second, if appropriate warnings
were given it is crucial whether the warnings were disre-
garded. Because available information is insufficient to pro-
vide answers to these factual issues, they must be dealt with
on a hypothetical basis. If no adequate warning was given,
the Soviet action would constitute a very serious breach of
international law, especially given the great number of inno-
cent passengers who lost their lives. Indeed, on September 5,
1983, the Soviet Union belatedly admitted that heavy loss of
civilian life had occurred.16' As far as the original shooting
down of the plane is concerned, however, it must be
remembered that according to the Soviet Union the airliner
was shot down because local Soviet commanders believed
that the trespassing plane was a military reconnaissance air-
craft rather than a civilian airliner. 62
Although the earliest American broadcasts concerning the
Korean Airlines incident asserted that no warning shots had
been fired, a revised statement issued by the State Depart-
ment showed that six minutes before the final shooting, the
Soviet pilot told his base that he had fired "cannon bursts". 1
63
The Soviet Union broadcast a television interview with the
Soviet pilot who had shot down the Korean plane.'64 By So-
viet bureacratic standards, such a public explanation of how
the shooting took place was a rare phenomenon. It is impor-
.. See N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1983, at 1.
Washington Post, Sept. 6, 1983, at 1.
See supra note 13.
N.Y. Times, Sept. 12, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
See N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1983, at 1, col. 4.
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tant to note that the Soviet Union not only deviated from its
policy of remaining secretive about government operations,
but it also made efforts to meet the major criticism leveled
against the use of force in the incident. The Soviets main-
tained that the plane was shot down only after warnings were
ignored by the intruder, and that the pilot was unable to
identify the plane as civilian in nature.165 Thus, the legal cul-
pability of the Soviet Union is uncertain because of insuffi-
cient factual information. The Soviet action was arguably
permissable if a clear warning was given and disregarded,
and if the military commanders actually and reasonably per-
ceived a serious threat to national security.
IX. CONCLUSION
Although there have been numerous cases of international
aerial trespass, existing treaty law still does not provide for
the situation where an intruder plane enters the airspace of a
foreign country and disobeys a landing order. There are pro-
visions proclaiming that sovereignty over airspace belongs to
the subjacent state, as well as rules which envisage that for-
eign aircraft will seek proper authorization before entering
foreign airspace. It is unclear, however, if an unauthorized
intruder becomes automatically liable to be shot at by the
interceptors of a territorial sovereign. The only treaty provi-
sion which indicates that a trespassing aircraft is not auto-
matically at the mercy of the subjacent state is the one
regarding aircraft in distress. 166 This provision suggests that
unauthorized entry will not, by itself, render an intruder sub-
ject to being fired upon by the interceptors of the territorial
sovereign whose airspace has been violated.
It appears that as a result of consistent state practice and
national legislation, the interception procedures outlined ear-
lier have acquired the force of customary rules of interna-
tional law. In other words, the interception rules in Annex 2
of the Chicago Convention are now consistent with interna-
Id
Chicago Convention, supra note 50, art. 25.
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tional practice in civil aviation. It is important to note, how-
ever, that the interception procedures do not specifically
describe what should happen if the intruder plane fails to
land. It is possible, therefore, that an intruder which fails to
land may justifiably be shot down. This is the assertion that
has been made consistently by the Soviet Union in previous
incidents of aerial trespass.
In the pleadings submitted by the three countries which
lost people or property when the Bulgarians shot down the
Israeli passenger plane in 1955, it was asserted that when an
unarmed passenger plane unwittingly enters the airspace of
another country, only two avenues are open to the subjacent
state: either attempt to land it safely or file diplomatic pro-
tests at a later date.1 67 In other words, a civilian plane, recog-
nized as such, should never be shot down. On the other
hand, the Soviet Union has consistently asserted that, in ac-
cordance with its domestic law, intruders will be warned, and
if they fail to respond they are open to attack. In some cases,
the other states involved have acquiesced in the Soviet
rule. 168
In sum, international law contains two conflicting princi-
ples with regard to aerial trespass. First, there is no provision
granting a subjacent state the right to shoot down an intrud-
ing plane which chooses to disobey a signal to land. In con-
trast, there is nothing in international law or custom which
unequivocally prohibits such action. Under the doctrine of
self-defense, force is only to be used against the aircraft of
other nations when national security risks of the subjacent
state are of an urgent nature. Therefore, unless the subjacent
state can show that the intruding plane's mission was hostile
' See supra text accompanying notes 100-119.
For example, in 1978, the Soviet Union forced a trespassing Korean Air Lines
jetliner to land on a frozen lake in Murmansk, U.S.S.R., after it disregarded warnings.
President Park of South Korea apologized for the incident and thanked the Soviet
Union for the quick release of the passengers and for the reasonable treament given the
crew, who were detained for questioning, then released. President Park's statements
were made in light of the fact that one crew member died in the forced downing of the
craft. N.Y. Times, Apr. 24, 1978, at 10, col. 4.
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or aggressive, it has no right under customary international
law to shoot down a civilian passenger plane.
In view of the conclusion that it is generally unlawful to
shoot a trespassing civilian airliner which disobeys a landing
order, it remains to be seen whether a civilian aircraft on a
spying mission, as alleged by the Soviets in the Korean Air-
lines incident, is fair game for violent retaliation. In such cir-
cumstances the lives of numerous innocent travellers may be
threatened, and therefore the subjacent state must present co-
gent proof of the military mission of such a plane in order to
justify itself in terms of self-defense. A mere allegation of self-
defense is wholly insufficient, rendering the subjacent state a
violator of international law and the murderer of innocent
people. It seems fair, however, for the subjacent state to rely
on a reasonable belief that the intruding aircraft poses a
threat to its national security in deciding what action to take.
An objective standard is essential for judging any such as-
serted reasonable belief in order to prevent abuses by subja-
cent countries.
As this article has pointed out, the applicable rules of inter-
national air law are plainly inadequate in dealing with inci-
dents such as the destruction of Korean Airlines Flight 007.
The only guidance available to analyze the rights of an in-
truding aircraft vis-a-vis the subjacent sovereign consists of
general principles of international law. The need for a mul-
tinational agreement to resolve this unsettled state of affairs is
both apparent and urgent.
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